Le Fatah réussit, dans le sang, son défi au Hamas

Some of the thousands who gathered before violence erupted Monday at a rally marking the anniversary of Yasir Arafat’s death. By TAGHREED EL-KHODARY and ISABEL KERSHNER

Alain Campiotti Gaza, Le Temps, 13.11.07. Le parti de Mahmoud Abbas a saisi l'occasion de l'anniversaire de la mort de Yasser Arafat pour contester les islamistes. Au prix du sang, le Fatah a réussi son premier grand défi au mouvement islamique qui contrôle le territoire depuis son coup de force de juin dernier. Les rumeurs de pourparlers entre les deux organisations rivales, qui contrôlent chacune un morceau de la Palestine en lambeaux, sont du coup évacuées. En tout cas jusqu'à la conférence d'Annapolis, qui doit s'ouvrir le 26 novembre dans le Maryland américain, où se rendra le président Mahmoud Abbas, et que le Hamas dénonce comme une duperie à l'échec programmé.

Depuis qu'il contrôle Gaza, le mouvement islamique a cherché à asseoir son pouvoir en occultant l'action du Fatah, par des arrestations, des confiscations d'armes, l'interdiction de toute manifestation. Mais il ne pouvait pas empêcher un rassemblement à la mémoire de Yasser Arafat, dont il célèbre lui-même désormais la figure, après l'avoir combattu.

Le Fatah a tout fait pour utiliser au maximum cette lucarne. Sur la côte montant de Rafah et de Khan Younis, un flot continu de taxis, de camions et de quelques bus roulaient vers le nord, drapeaux jaunes (la couleur du parti) au vent. Le Hamas a cherché à entraver l'utilisation des bus, avec un succès relatif.

La veille déjà, des fourgonnettes munies de haut-parleurs sillonnaient les rues de la ville pour appeler les Gaziotes à se rendre à Al-Kitab. Des petites échauffourées avaient eu lieu dimanche sur l'avenue devant les universités, dans les cités et dans les camps du sud.

Les moyens engagés par le Fatah étaient visibles sur la place. Des drapeaux, des casquettes quadrillées comme le keffieh, des T-shirts tout neufs. Deux immenses portraits d'Arafat avaient été accrochés aux immeubles du côté de la mer, comme la sonorisation. Ahmed Helles, l'un des chefs du parti à Gaza, a célébré devant plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes cette réplique à «ceux qui disaient que le Fatah était mort».

C'est vers la fin de la manifestation que les tirs ont commencé plus au nord. Le Fatah affirme que des hommes masqués de la Force exécutive du Hamas ont ouvert le feu sur la foule, sans qu'il n'y ait eu de provocation. Le Hamas dit qu'il a répliqué à des jets de pierre et à des tirs. Des témoins remarquaient aussi que les militants du parti d'Arafat lançaient cette insulte aux hommes en noir: «Shia», autrement dit chiites - ce qu'ils ne sont pas; manière de dire: serviteur d'une puissance étrangère, l'Iran. La fusillade a eu pour effet de vider très vite l'immense terrain qui jouxte Rimal - ce qu'on peut appeler les beaux quartiers de Gaza en friche.

A Ramallah, en Cisjordanie, Mahmoud Abbas a dénoncé «les crimes haineux» commis par le mouvement islamiste dans le territoire du sud. Mohammed Dahlan, l'ancien responsable de la sécurité à Gaza pour le Fatah, a appelé les militants à continuer leur action pour obtenir «la chute du mouvement fasciste».

Les Gaziotes, qui souffrent sous le blocus, sont sans doute moins nombreux à soutenir le Hamas que lors des élections de janvier 2006, mais ils ne tiennent Dahlan ni comme leur guide, ni comme leur protecteur: cet homme à poigne est pour eux le symbole même de la corruption qui a miné le Fatah. En juin, les villas qu'il s'était fait construire ont été littéralement dépecées.

!!!!!Gaza gas given as a gift by then-Prime Minister Barak to the PA!!!!!

IsraelNationalNews, 25.10.07. Former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon maintains, in a paper he prepared for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, that one of the reasons Israel is not invading Gaza is its fear that the PA will hold off on supplying Israel with gas from an off shore gas field discovered by Israel in 2000. The field, with an estimated worth of $4 billion of gas, was given as a gift by then-Prime Minister Barak to the PA, which is developing it together with British Gas. Ex-Prime Minister Sharon opposed the deal, fearing that revenues would be used to fund terrorism, but Prime Minister Olmert apparently plans to go ahead with it.

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A tale of two factions

Conal Urquhart in Gaza City traces the recent fortunes of Hamas and Fatah in Gaza. Guardian Unlimited. 24.10.07. From its establishment, in 1994, the Palestinian Authority was dominated by Fatah. Hamas refused to run in elections because it felt doing so would imply acceptance of Israel and the Oslo accords, both of which they rejected. But then, in 2005, it changed its mind.

January 2006: Hamas wins elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council
To its surprise, Hamas wins the Palestinian legislative elections, taking 76 seats out of a total of 132. Hamas has not planned for such a victory, hoping to a be a vociferous opposition party. Realising they are not ready for government, the party leaders hope a spell in opposition will allow them to maintain their ideological purity and prepare for government in the future.

March 2006: Hamas forms a government
Initially, Hamas hopes to form a unity government with Fatah, but some Fatah leaders believe the best way to get rid of Hamas quickly will be to force it to rule alone. Eventually, Hamas decides to form its own government, seeking out technocrats from its ranks around the world and summoning them to the West Bank and Gaza. However, the international community is loth to accept the democratic choice of the Palestinian people. It insists that Hamas renounce violence, acknowledge the existence of Israel and respect all agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. When Hamas declines, Israel stops all tax transfers to the Palestinian Authority; then the US and other western governments suspend aid. Hamas works to bypass the sanctions, sometimes resorting to smuggling cash in suitcases. But it cannot operate. In addition, Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, controls the security forces. In the absence of a single source of power, Gaza descends into chaos.

June 2006: Hamas kills two Israeli soldiers and kidnaps a third
At some point in 2006, there is a split in the Hamas movement, and the military wing decides to launch an attack on Israel in an attempt to break the political logjam. On June 25, a group of militants infiltrates Israel via a tunnel and attacks an army post, killing two soldiers and capturing a third, Gilad Shalit, who remains in captivity in Gaza.

March 2007: A national unity government is formed
Israel's attacks on Gaza only increase, and eventually Hamas successfully renews its efforts to look for a national unity government. But the international community rejects the government, and tension between Fatah and Hamas increases.

With Fatah and Hamas fighters engaged in series of tit-for-tat murders, it appears that the US was planning to train Fatah and Palestinian Authority forces to retake Gaza. Mahmoud Abbas's presidential guard is strengthened and given new duties. The guard receives new uniforms and black American jeeps.

June 2007: Hamas attacks and defeats Fatah and Palestinian Authority forces in Gaza
In fact, the aid and training fail to materialise, but the media reports and rumours are strong enough to persuade Hamas's military leaders it must take action against the parts of the Palestinian Authority it felt were actively trying to destabilise it, in particular the so-called preventative security forces associated with Mohammed Dahlan. What starts as a series of clashes turns into a rout. Some Fatah members are brutally killed, and others flee. Hamas suddenly has complete control of Gaza.

The initial brutality and speed of the coup shocks Gaza: drivers begin to drive courteously, families settle longstanding feuds, and the kidnappers holding the BBC journalist Alan Johnston are told by Hamas to give him up immediately - which, eventually (on July 4), they do. Gazans and foreigners all speak of a sense of security, and Hamas officials boast about how quickly they have imposed security where Abbas failed.

June 2007-present:
But the honeymoon is short-lived: Hamas withdraws its police from the streets, and Gaza's roads return to their familiar chaos. Armed groups affiliated with Fatah and Islamic Jihad challenge the Hamas ban on guns, leading to gunfights. Criminal groups begin to gain confidence, and car thefts and kidnappings of Palestinians resume.

Hamas remains the dominant power in Gaza, but Mahmoud Abbas dissolves the government and appoints a new one, headed by Salam Fayad. The new government orders its employees, around 60,000 people, in Gaza not to turn up for work. As Hamas is no longer in government, international aid and tax transfers are resumed to the government in Ramallah, allowing it to pay its employees in the West Bank and Gaza. Meanwhile, Israel increases pressure on Gaza's civilian population by slowly reducing the amount of food it allows into the strip.

Since the coup, Fatah has organised a series of demonstrations against Hamas in Gaza, and health workers affiliated with Fatah have been on strike in protest at the appointment of Hamas members to senior hospital positions.

Despite the friction between the sides, however, Fatah and Hamas officials have expressed the hope that they will re-enter negotiations on unity government, although it is unclear how the international community and Israel will react to the presence of Hamas in government again.

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The Palestinian Mandela

Uri Avnery, Gush Shalom, 15/09/07. SOME SEE Marwan Barghouti as the Palestinian Nelson Mandela.

In appearances, the two are very different, both physically and in temperament. But they have much in common.

Both became national heroes behind prison bars. Both were convicted of terrorism. Both supported violent struggle. Mandela supported the 1961 decision of the National African Congress to start an armed struggle against the racist government (but not against the white civilians). He remained in prison for 28 years and refused to buy his freedom by signing a statement denouncing "terrorism". Marwan supported the armed struggle of Fatah's Tanzim organization and has been sentenced to several life terms.

But both were in favor of peace and reconciliation, even before going to prison. I saw Barghouti for the first time in 1997, when he joined a Gush Shalom demonstration in Harbata, the village neighboring Bil'in, against the building of the Modiin-Illit settlement that was just starting. Five years later, during his trial, we demonstrated in the courthouse under the slogan "Barghouti to the negotiating table, not to prison!"

LAST WEEK we visited Marwan's family in Ramallah.

I had met Fadwa Barghouti for the first time at Yasser Arafat's funeral. Her face was wet with tears. We were crowded among the multitude of mourners, the din was ear-splitting and we could not exchange more than a few words.

This time she was calm and composed. She laughed only when she heard that Teddy Katz, a Gush activist who took part in the meeting, had sacrificed a toenail for Marwan: during our protest in court we were violently attacked by the guards and one of them stamped his heavy boot on Teddy's sandaled foot.

Fadwa Barghouti is a lawyer by profession, a mother of four (three sons, one daughter). The oldest, Kassem, has already been in prison for half a year without trial. She is a dark-blond woman ("All the family members, except Marwan, are blond," she explained, adding with a rare smile: "Perhaps because of the Crusaders.")

The Barghoutis are a large Hamula (extended family), inhabiting six villages near Bir Zeit. Dr. Mustapha Barghouti, the physician who is well-known for his human rights activities, is a distant relative. Marwan and Fadwa - also a Barghouti by birth - were born in Kobar village.

Marwan Barghouti's family lives in a nice apartment in a co-dominion building. On my way there, I noticed the widespread building activity in Ramallah - it looks as if new buildings are going on every corner, including commercial high-rises.

Near the door of the apartment, an embroidered sign says in English: "Welcome to my home". The apartment itself is decorated with many images of Marwan Barghouti, including a large drawing inspired by the famous photo that shows him in court, raising his handcuffed arms above his head like a victorious boxer. When the security forces were searching for him, they took possession of the apartment for three days and raised a large Israeli flag on the balcony.

Fadwa Barghouti is one of the few persons allowed to visit him. Not as a lawyer, but only as "close family" - a definition that includes parents, spouses, siblings and children under 16.

At present, there are about 11 thousand Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Assuming an average of five "close family" members, that makes 55 thousand potential visitors. Those, too, need a permit for each visit, and many are rejected for "security reasons". Fadwa also needs a permit every time, which allows her only to go directly to the prison and back, without stopping anywhere in Israel. The three sons are not allowed to meet their father anymore, since all three have passed the age of 16. Only the young daughter can visit him.

THERE IS hardly anyone who is more popular with the Palestinian public than Marwan Barghouti. In this, too, he resembles Mandela while in prison.

It is difficult to explain the source of this authority. It does not emanate from his high position in Fatah, since the movement is disorganized and there is hardly any clear hierarchy. From the time when he was a simple activist in his village, he rose in the organization by sheer force of personality. It is that mysterious thing called charisma. He radiates a quiet authority that does not depend on outward signs.

The war of vilification between Fatah and Hamas does not touch him. Hamas takes care not to attack him. On the contrary, when they submitted a list of prisoners in exchange for the captured soldier Gilad Shalit, Marwan Barghouti, in spite of his being a Fatah leader, headed the list.

It was he who, together with the imprisoned leaders of the other organizations, composed the famous "prisoners' document", which called for national unity. All Palestinian factions accepted the document. Thus the "Mecca agreement", which created the (short-lived) Government of National Unity, was born. Before it was signed by the parties, urgent messengers were sent to Marwan, in order to obtain his agreement. Only when this was given, did the signing take place.

I TOOK advantage of my visit in Ramallah in order to get an impression of the opinions of Barghouti's adherents. They try not to be swept away by the climate of mutual hate that now governs the leaderships of the two sides.

Some of them strenuously oppose the Hamas actions in Gaza, but try to understand the causes. According to them, the Hamas people, unlike many of the Fatah leaders, have never been in the West and have not attended foreign universities. Their mental world was formed by the religious education system. Their horizon is narrow. The complex international situation, in which the Palestinian national movement is compelled to operate, is quite foreign to them.

In the last elections, my interlocutors explained, Hamas hoped to gain 35-40% of the votes and thus gain legitimacy for their movement. They were totally surprised when they got the majority. They did not know what to do with it. They had no ready plans. It was a mistake on their part to set up a government composed entirely of Hamas members, instead of insisting on a unity government. They misjudged the international and Israeli reaction.

Marwan's adherents do not shrink back from self-criticism. In their opinion, Fatah is not without blame for what happened in Gaza. The movement did not act wisely when they arrested and humiliated the Hamas leaders. For example, they arrested Mahmoud al-Zahar, the foreign minister in the Hamas government, humiliated him, cut off his beard and called him by the name of a famous Egyptian female dancer. This is one of the reasons for the burning hatred al-Zahar and his colleagues hold for Fatah.

I did not hear denials of the Hamas contention, that Muhammad Dahlan, the former confidant and security advisor of Mahmoud Abbas, conspired with the Americans to carry out a military coup in the Gaza Strip. Dahlan, the darling of the Americans (and the Israelis) believed, according to them, that, if provided with arms and money, he could take over Gaza. That pushed Hamas to the decision to act first and carry out an armed takeover themselves. Since the majority of the public supported Hamas and detested Dahlan, who was accused of collaborating with the occupation, Hamas easily won. Dahlan has now been sent into exile by Abbas.

Hamas' center of gravity is in the Gaza Strip. That is the problem of Khaled Mashal, the Hamas leader who resides in Damascus. Unlike his two deputies, he has no roots in Gaza. That's why he needs money to reinforce his standing there. He gets it from Iran.

(I would have liked to give some impressions here of the Hamas point of view, but it is quite impossible to enter the Gaza Strip, while our Hamas interlocutors in East Jerusalem have all been sent to prison.)

HOW WILL the Palestinians get out of this bind? How can they reestablish a national leadership that will be accepted by all parts of the people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, able to lead the national struggle and make peace with Israel, when peace becomes possible??

Bargouti's followers believe that at the right time, when Israel comes to the conclusion that it needs peace, he will be released from prison and play a central role in the reconciliation - much as Mandela was released from prison in South Africa when the white government came to the conclusion that the Apartheid regime could not be sustained anymore. I have no doubt that In order to bring such a situation about, the Israeli peace forces must start a big public campaign for Barghouti's release.

What will happen in the meantime?

There is hardly anyone on the Palestinian side who believes that Ehud Olmert will conclude a peace agreement and implement it. Hardly anyone believes that anything will come out of the "international meeting" that is supposed to take place in November. The Palestinians believe that it is a bone thrown by President Bush to Condoleezza Rice, whose standing has been dropping dramatically.

And if that has no results?

"There is no vacuum," one of the Fatah leaders told me, "If the efforts of President Abbas do not bear fruit, there will be another explosion, like the intifada after the failure of Camp David."

How is that possible, after the Fatah activists have turned over their arms and foresworn violence? "A new generation will arise," my interlocutor said, "As has happened before - one age-group gets tired and its place is taken by the next one. If the occupation does not come to an end and there is no peace, a peace that will enable the members of this generation to turn to the universities, to family, work and business, a new intifada will surely break out."

To achieve peace, the Palestinians need national unity, much as the Israelis need a consensus for withdrawal. The man who symbolizes the hope for unity among the Palestinians is sitting now in Hasharon jail.

Gaza a tutto gas: grazie all'inviato di pace Blair finirà agli israeliani tutto il petrolio palestinese

Michele Giorgio. il manifesto. 31/07/07. Quasi pronto l'accordo tra Olmert, Anp e British gas: ad Ashqelon il greggio della Striscia. Tel Aviv pagherà poco e potrà chiudere i rubinetti quando vorrà. Blair che anni fa seguì con attenzione la firma dell'accordo tra Anp e BG, ora non ha mosso un dito per suggerire cambiamenti che consentano ai palestinesi di incassare di più dal gas di Gaza. Presto il governo di Ehud Olmert, la BG e l'esecutivo del premier Salam Fayyad, firmeranno un accordo che di fatto metterà a disposizione di Israele energia a basso costo e, soprattutto, la possibilità di bloccare i fondi palestinesi, così come già fa nel caso delle entrate derivanti da dazi doganali e dall'Iva che raccoglie alle frontiere per conto dell'Anp. La BG infatti indirizzerà il piccolo gasdotto verso Ashqelon e Ashdod, rendendo così Israele l'unico acquirente del gas palestinese. Gaza sarà evitata e con essa il movimento islamico Hamas che la controlla dal 15 giugno. Ed è ovvio che, dovessero esplodere in futuro nuove rivolte palestinesi o incrinarsi i rapporti con Abu Mazen, Israele avrà la facoltà di sospendere subito il pagamento della bolletta del gas ricevuto dai palestinesi. Nel frattempo indiscrezioni di stampa riferiscono che dietro l'accordo si nascondano personaggi dalla fama non proprio limpida, come l'ex consigliere economico della presidenza dell'Anp, Mohammed Rashid (amico dell'ex «uomo forte» di Gaza Mohammed Dahlan) e Yossi Maimanm, un ex agente del Mossad ora a capo della compagnia israeliana che riceverà e distribuirà il gas palestinese.

Tony Blair, in qualità di nuovo inviato del Quartetto per il Medio Oriente (Usa, Russia, Onu e Ue) ha cominciato a lavorare ad un piano «economico di pace», informava un paio di giorni fa il quotidiano Maariv di Tel Aviv. L'ex premier britannico avrebbe in mente un incontro tra 100 uomini d'affari israeliani e palestinesi per dare vita ad una «imprenditoria di pace». Si tratta di un'idea che, dicono, piace al premier israeliano Olmert. Difficile dire quanto al presidente dell'Anp Abu Mazen. Tuttavia è poca cosa e sarebbe stato molto meglio affrontare subito il tema dello sviluppo e della «liberazione» dell'economia palestinese, strangolata dall'occupazione militare. Delle riserve di gas naturale di Gaza, ad esempio. Una ricchezza che potrebbe garantire ad una delle aree palestinesi più povere, diverse centinaia di posti di lavoro e salari per i prossimi anni.
Ma l'inviato del Quartetto ha un'idea ben diversa dello sfruttamento dei giacimenti del gas di Gaza - che vede coinvolta la BG (British Gas) Group - che non va nella direzione di garantire i diritti del popolo in possesso di questa eccezionale risorsa. Blair che anni fa seguì con attenzione la firma dell'accordo tra Anp e BG, ora non ha mosso un dito per suggerire cambiamenti che consentano ai palestinesi di incassare di più dal gas di Gaza. Presto il governo di Ehud Olmert, la BG e l'esecutivo del premier Salam Fayyad, firmeranno un accordo che di fatto metterà a disposizione di Israele energia a basso costo e, soprattutto, la possibilità di bloccare i fondi palestinesi, così come già fa nel caso delle entrate derivanti da dazi doganali e dall'Iva che raccoglie alle frontiere per conto dell'Anp. La BG infatti indirizzerà il piccolo gasdotto verso Ashqelon e Ashdod, rendendo così Israele l'unico acquirente del gas palestinese. Gaza sarà evitata e con essa il movimento islamico Hamas che la controlla dal 15 giugno. Ed è ovvio che, dovessero esplodere in futuro nuove rivolte palestinesi o incrinarsi i rapporti con Abu Mazen, Israele avrà la facoltà di sospendere subito il pagamento della bolletta del gas ricevuto dai palestinesi.
Il giacimento marino di Gaza - quasi 300 miliardi di metri cubi - fu scoperto dalla BG Group all'inizio degli anni 90. Israele scattò subito in piedi e affermò che si estendeva anche alle sue acque regionali e quindi chiese la sua «parte». Gli studi internazionali invece provarono che il giacimento era interamente in acque palestinesi. Un colpo allo stomaco di Tel Aviv che la BG attenuò offrendo di destinare il gas a Israele e in minima parte alla centrale elettrica di Gaza. La BG però rifiutò l'offerta israeliana di 53 centesimi di dollaro per barile di petrolio equivalente - un prezzo minimo se si tiene presente quello che è attualmente il costo del greggio e del gas sul mercato mondiale - e minacciò di vendere il gas agli egiziani. Tony Blair intervenne per bloccare le intenzione della BG e per rimettere tutto «in ordine». Divenuto inviato del Quartetto, Blair non muove un dito per consentire ai palestinesi di trarre maggior beneficio dall'unica risorsa energetica sulla quale possono contare.
Interrotti i colloqui con gli egiziani, lo scorso aprile la BG ha accettato la seconda offerta di Israele: 77 centesimi di dollaro. Lo Stato ebraico importerà 1,6 milioni di metri cubici l'anno per 15 anni del gas palestinese che raggiungerà i depositi israeliani ad Ashdod attraverso un condotto marino.
Per Israele è un accordo eccezionalmente buono. Il gas palestinese soddisferà il 10% del suo fabbisogno energetico ad un prezzo inferiore del 50% di quello che avrebbero dovuto pagare, ad esempio, per il gas del vicino Egitto. Del valore complessivo del gas, 4 miliardi di dollari, l'Anp invece vedrà solo le briciole: secondo alcune stime, appena 100 milioni di dollari l'anno in royalty per la sua quota nel progetto. Soldi che peraltro finiranno in un conto bancario internazionale e non direttamente nelle casse dell'Anp, mentre alcuni esperti palestinesi avevano suggerito la creazione di un fondo di sviluppo per progetti infrastrutturali in Cisgiordania e Gaza.
Nel frattempo indiscrezioni di stampa riferiscono che dietro l'accordo si nascondano personaggi dalla fama non proprio limpida, come l'ex consigliere economico della presidenza dell'Anp, Mohammed Rashid (amico dell'ex «uomo forte» di Gaza Mohammed Dahlan) e Yossi Maimanm, un ex agente del Mossad ora a capo della compagnia israeliana che riceverà e distribuirà il gas palestinese.

Turning Palestine's Most Valuable Natural Resource into a Political Tool. Gaza was a Gas for Blair

Arthur Nelsen. Counterunch. 27/07/07. On April 29, two weeks before fighting flared in Gaza, Yossi Maiman, co-owner of the Israeli gas company EMG, claimed that in 2004, while he was in talks to join the project, it was revealed to him that shares in it were being held in trust for two confidential partners: Mohammed Rashid and Martin Schlaff. BG denied the claims but they were damaging. Schlaff is a millionaire who was investigated on charges of attempting to bribe Ariel Sharon in 2006. Mohammed Rashid is a former director general of the Palestine Investment Fund and erstwhile "mentor" and ally to the now-exiled Gazan warlord Mohammed Dahlan. Conflicts Forum website described Rashid as a sometime advisor to the US and "an essential part of America's programme to undermine Hamas". Yossi Maiman is reportedly a former employee of the Mossad. So is Shabtai Shavit, the CEO of his company who was condemned by Israel's attorney general in 2004 for using his intelligence connections to advance EMG's interests in the Gaza gas fields [...]

The Gaza maritime field is estimated to contain between 35-40bn cubic metres--or one trillion cubic feet--of gas. In the words of the British Foreign Office, it is "by far the most valuable Palestinian natural resource" and revenues from its output are usually estimated at $4bn. For this reason, Ariel Sharon always opposed its development, claiming that monies raised might be used to arm Israel's enemies.

In the summer of 2005, when Sharon was focused on "disengagement" from Gaza, BG signed a memorandum with the Egyptian company EGAS to sell the gas there. But the deal was scuppered a year later, when Tony Blair intervened at the last minute to plead the Israeli government's case to BG, allegedly following a request from Ehud Olmert [...]

Ever sensitive to popular anger at the exploitation of Palestine's national treasure, one of Hamas's first demands after seizing power in Gaza was for a renegotiation of the BG contract. Ziad Thatha, the Hamas economic minister, had previously denounced the deal as "an act of theft" and modern-day Balfour Declaration, that "sells Palestinian gas to the Zionist occupation".

His words might have been a response to the circumvention of the Gaza Strip in the deal, which will pipe gas directly onshore to Ashkelon in Israel.

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Arthur Neslen is a journalist working in Tel Aviv. The first Jewish employee of Aljazeera.net and a four-year veteran of the BBC, Neslen has contributed to numerous periodicals over the years, including The Guardian, The Observer, The Independent and Red Pepper. His first book, Occupied Minds: A journey through the Israeli psyche, was recently published by Pluto Press.

Si dimette l'uomo forte di Fatah

Michele Giorgio. il manifesto. 27/07/07. L'aviazione israeliana continua a colpire per esasperare la tensione nella Striscia: uccisi tre militanti della Jihad islamica e uno di Hamas. Un giovane che avrebbe tentato d'accoltellare un soldato ammazzato a manganellate ad un check point nei pressi di Betlemme. Mohammed Dahlan non è più un membro dell'Autorità nazionale palestinese (Anp). Si è dimesso ieri dall'incarico di consigliere per la sicurezza, che di fatto non occupava più dal 18 giugno, da quando era stato travolto dalle critiche per il crollo di Fatah, in appena cinque giorni di combattimenti con il movimento islamico Hamas, che ora controlla completamente Gaza. Dahlan, a quanto pare, ha rassegnato le sue dimissioni su richiesta della commissione d'inchiesta sui fatti di Gaza, anche se l'ex «uomo forte» di Fatah ha motivato con «precarie condizioni salute» la sua decisione. «A causa della mia lunga assenza e di problemi di salute, spero che accettiate la fine della mia missione. Resterò sempre un soldato fedele al vostro seguito», ha scritto al presidente Abu Mazen. Le sue parole però non devono ingannare. In realtà Dahlan non esce di scena, ma compie solo una ritirata strategica e in ogni caso le sue dimissioni non bastano a ridare ai vertici dell'Anp una immagine di pulizia e correttezza dopo anni di abusi di potere e corruzione. Non sono sufficienti a far cicatrizzare la ferita dell'umiliazione pesantissima subita da Fatah e dalle forze di sicurezza da lui pagate, addestrate e armate (con fondi esteri) che si sono sciolte come neve al sole ai primi accenni di attacco da parte delle milizie di Hamas.
I mezzi d'informazione internazionali ieri hanno rilanciato con enfasi la notizia delle dimissioni dell'ex uomo forte di Fatah. Ma i palestinesi non si fanno illusioni. Sanno che americani, britannici e israeliani vedono in Dahlan il successore «ideale» di Abu Mazen alla guida di una Anp chiamata ad issare la bandiera palestinese su uno staterello di pochi chilometri quadrati. George Bush peraltro preme, vuole un accordo tra israeliani e palestinesi prima della fine del suo mandato, come ha riferito due giorni fa lo stesso Abu Mazen, in un'intervista al quotidiano israeliano Maariv. Osservando la situazione sul terreno i palestinesi da qui a un anno non potranno che ottenere lo Stato con i confini provvisori - senza Gerusalemme capitale e senza sovranità - che il premier israeliano Olmert di fatto ha descritto nella proposta di «accordo di principio» che ha formulato l'altro ieri.
Dahlan è scaltro, sa che ora deve farsi da parte, in modo da poter rientrare in scena al momento opportuno. Nemico giurato di Hamas, era stato nominato il 18 marzo consigliere per la sicurezza nazionale, nonostante le proteste del movimento islamico, e aveva immediatamente presentato un piano di riorganizzazione dei servizi di sicurezza per dare potere solo alle forze fedeli ad Abu Mazen, trascurando le responsabilità in materia di sicurezza che lo Statuto dell'Anp assegna al ministero dell'interno. La formazione del governo di unità nazionale Fatah-Hamas, non lo aveva convinto a cessare le sue attività di erosione del potere di Hamas. Un'azione continua, provocatoria, svolta assieme ai suoi stretti collaboratori - Rashid Abu Shbak e Samir Mashrawi - che alla fine, nonostante le armi e i fondi ricevuti, non ha impedito al movimento islamico di sbaragliare in pochi giorni e con il minimo sforzo migliaia di agenti delle forze di sicurezza.
Già all'inizio dell'Intifada Dahlan aveva dato le dimissioni, per poi tornare in pista nel momento più critico, quello della rioccupazione israeliana delle aree autonome palestinesi in Cisgiordania nel 2002, per mediare la «salvezza» di Yasser Arafat e di quel poco che rimaneva dell'Anp. Una manovra che non esiterà a ripetere in futuro.
Sale nel frattempo il numero dei militanti palestinesi eliminati da Israele con le cosiddette «uccisioni mirate». Ieri altri tre palestinesi sono stati uccisi dai missili lanciati da un aereo che ha centrato l'auto a bordo della quale viaggiava Omar Karim, delle Brigate al Quds (Jihad). Sharif Breissi, delle Brigate Ezzedin Qassam (Hamas), invece è stato colpito e ucciso dal fuoco di un carro armato israeliano durante una incursione di reparti corazzati a Rafah.
Un giovane palestinese è stato ammazzato in circostanze da chiarire nei pressi di Betlemme. Secondo i militari il ragazzo - che fonti palestinesi descrivono come mentalmente disabile - ha provato ad accoltellare un soldato a un posto di blocco. Fonti palestinesi invece non parlano di alcun tentativo di accoltellamento. A quel punto un commilitone del presunto aggredito sarebbe intervenuto, colpendo ripetutamente alla testa con un manganello il giovane, morto poco dopo - dopo essere stato soccorso da medici palestinesi - per le ferite riportate.

http://www.ilmanifesto.it/Quotidiano-archivio/27-Luglio-2007/art30.html

James D. Wolfensohn: 'All the dreams we had are now gone'

Shahar Smooha. Haaretz Magazine. excerpts. 22/07/07. For more than a year, Wolfensohn kept his feelings about his year in the Middle East to himself. He watched, appalled, as the disengagement plan failed and as violence continued to rage in the region. It was only after the recent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas and the appointment of former British prime minister Tony Blair to the post he held that Wolfensohn agreed to speak on the record. Indeed, the impression is that he considers it his duty to do so.

"Israeli youth finish high school and spend two-three years in the army, and then go to Thailand and other places and smoke pot to get over it, then come back and start their lives when they're 24. I don't think that's an ideal way for the next generation of Israel to live their lives. Instead of hope, the Palestinians saw that they were put back in prison. And with 50 percent unemployment, you would have conflict. This is not just a Palestinian issue. If you have 50 percent of your people with no work, chances are they will become annoyed. So it's not, in my opinion, that Palestinians are so terrible; it is that they were in a situation where a modulation of views between one and the other became impossible. And you can blame the Palestinians because there were those among them who were firing rockets or you can blame the Israelis for overreacting," he continues. "But either way - whichever side you take - the situation that emerged was that you had 50 percent of the population frustrated, no resources, and a border which was corrupt on both sides. I saw it with my own eyes: Israelis and Palestinians, arm in arm, walking off together and clearly pricing how you could get your truck to the top of the line or get it through at all. It was an absolutely transparently corrupt system at the border - you had to buy your truck's way across. I thought it was a disgrace." The issue of the greenhouses is especially painful to Wolfensohn because of his personal contribution to them. "Everything was rotting because you couldn't get the fruit. And if you went to the border, as I did many times, and saw tomatoes and fruit just being dumped on the side of the road, you would have to say that if you were a Palestinian farmer you'd be pretty upset. So my view is to try and not demonize the Palestinians. I'm not denying that there are Palestinians who fire rockets and do terrible things; I know that that happens. But to get a fundamental solution, you have to have hope on both sides. Fatah wasn't that popular at the time. A lot of people thought that the Fatah leadership was overpaid. The Palestinians, at least, did. They thought they had a dishonest leadership - not, I think, at the level of Abu Mazen, but at a ministerial level. They felt that there was an elite class that was taking advantage of the situation, and that the only way they could get some improvement was by electing a group that, at least at the time, was perceived as straightforward. My own opinion is that the decision to move to Hamas was partly ideological, but partly because of the failure of the Fatah leadership. I know that to be the case and so does everybody who was there." Wolfensohn had discussions with the Fatah leadership, he says, "but at the time they were pretty self-confident. If you look at [Mohammed] Dahlan, the people who were there, the informal leaders - there wasn't a lot of talk about Hamas ousting them. I thought it was a problem for them to drive their shiny Mercedes through refugee camps and said so many times. It's not only that, it's also the building of the big houses, the private armies. According to James Wolfensohn, the major blame for the failure of his Middle East mission lies with him. "I feel that if anything, I was stupid for not reading the small print," he admits. "I was never given the mandate to negotiate the peace." The mandate he received, he says - which is identical to the one Tony Blair has now been given - was solely to try to improve the economic situation in the territories and to improve the Palestinians' situation in general, whereas he naively thought that this included intervention to advance peace. In 2005, Wolfensohn's access to the G7 leaders may have made it easier for him to extract from them a commitment for a $9-billion package to ameliorate the situation of the Palestinian economy. However, he says, afterward Condoleezza Rice and Elliot Abrams made it very clear to him that intervention in peace negotiations was not within his purview. "I had to fight my way into the November [2005] meeting when Secretary Rice announced the six-point plan. I was there with Javier Solana when it was announced, and what I didn't realize was that that was the death penalty, because after that the Israelis and the Americans took apart that agreement one by one, and I knew less and less what was happening. And my team of 18 people was fired. So I was left with no office and no people, and even though they asked me to stay on, it was pretty clear to me that the only thing to do was to get out. The expenses on military and intelligence in Israel are probably greater than in any democracy I know of, and I can understand that, given the situation, but as a continuing characteristic of the country, I don't think it's hopeful. To me it is so bloody sad that all the creativity you have in Israeli youth has to go through this experience in the army, risking their lives," Wolfensohn says, casting his gaze far beyond Central Park. "Israeli youth finish high school and spend two-three years in the army, and then go to Thailand and other places and smoke pot to get over it, then come back and start their lives when they're 24. I don't think that's an ideal way for the next generation of Israel to live their lives."

excerpts. full text at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/884018.html

Overcoming the conspiracy against Palestine

Mohammed Dahlan's 13 July 2003 letter to then Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz.

Ali Abunimah. electronic intifada. 18/07/07

"Be certain that Yasser Arafat's final days are numbered, but allow us to finish him off our way, not yours. And be sure as well that ... the promises I made in front of President Bush, I will give my life to keep." Those words were written by the Fatah warlord Mohammed Dahlan, whose US- and Israeli-backed forces were routed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip last month, in a 13 July 2003 letter to then Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz and published on Hamas' website on 4 July this year.

Dahlan, who despite his failure to hold Gaza, remains a senior advisor to Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas, outlines his conspiracy to overthrow Arafat, destroy Palestinian institutions and replace them with a quisling leadership subservient to Israel. Dahlan writes of his fear that Arafat would convene the Palestinian legislative council and ask it to withdraw confidence from then prime minister Mahmoud Abbas, who had been appointed earlier in 2003 at Bush's insistence in order to curb Arafat's influence. Dahlan wrote that "complete coordination and cooperation by all" was needed to prevent this, as well as "subjecting [Arafat] to pressure so that he cannot carry out this step." Dahlan reveals that "we have already begun attempts to polarize the views of many legislative council members by intimidation and temptation so that they will be on our side and not his [Arafat's]."

Dahlan closes his letter to Mofaz saying, "it remains only for me to convey my gratitude to you and the prime minister [Ariel Sharon] for your continued confidence in us, and to you all respect."

This letter is a small but vivid piece of evidence to add to the existing mountain, of the conspiracy in which the Abbas leadership is involved. In the month since Abbas' appointment of a Vichy-style "emergency government" headed by Salam Fayad, historic Fatah leaders, such as Farouq Qaddumi and Hani al-Hassan have signalled their opposition to Abbas' actions, specifically rejecting his order that Palestinian resistance fighters disarm while Israeli occupation continues unchallenged.

This underscores that the split among Palestinians today is not between Hamas and Fatah, nor between "extremist" or "moderate," or "Islamist" or "secular," but between the minority who have cast their lot in with the enemy as collaborators on the one hand, and those who uphold the right and duty to resist on the other.

Israeli leaders, at least, are crystal clear about what they expect from their Palestinian servants. Ephraim Sneh, until recently deputy defense minister, expresses the consensus view of the Israeli establishment:

"The most urgent and important mission for Israel at this time is preventing a Hamas takeover of the West Bank. It is possible to do this by weakening Hamas through visible diplomatic progress; helping the effective and successful functioning of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayad's government; and the creation of conditions for the total failure of the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip" ("How to stop Hamas," Haaretz, 17 July 2007).

Sneh makes clear that "in order to emerge victorious, military campaigns and arrests are not enough -- it is imperative to bring about [Hamas'] political-public defeat via another Palestinian element." This element is Fatah. Sneh lists a number of measures designed to achieve this, including employing more Palestinians as low-wage laborers in the Israeli economy, releasing Fatah prisoners and giving back Palestinian tax money stolen by Israel -- but says absolutely nothing about stopping the construction of Jewish-only Israeli colonies, ending military occupation and abrogating racist laws and practices. With characteristic vagueness he only asserts that "it is necessary to embark on a discussion with the Palestinian president about the principles of the permanent status agreement." Fourteen years after Oslo, this is not likely to convince too many skeptics.

Since the Oslo accords were signed, Israel has done all it can to undermine the prospects of Palestinian statehood, consistently hobbling the Palestinian Authority. What lies behind Israel's determination to prop up Abbas' quisling leadership? Why not just let it all collapse and declare victory?

Israeli leaders know that shoring up support for an ethnic "Jewish state" depends on concealing the reality that Jews are no longer the majority population in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip -- the territory controlled by the Israeli state. Israel needs the fig leaf of a Palestinian sovereign to take millions of Palestinians off its books, the way apartheid South Africa attempted to deploy the cover of "independent Black homelands" -- Bantustans -- to prolong white rule and give it a veneer of legitimacy. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, Fatah which has no popular base, will collapse with it.

As for Hamas, it stands at a crossroads. It can survive the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, but what will it become? It grew from a segment of Palestinian society -- poor, religiously mobilized masses, yet it draws much broader support for its resistance against Israel from Palestinians orphaned by their turncoat leaders and hungry for a principled alternative. Hamas has the choice to articulate an agenda that can live up to the aspirations of Palestinian society in all its diversity, or it can leap into the traps that are being set for it.

Hamas leaders have made exemplary statements in favor of pluralism, genuine democracy, and the rule of law, and were rightly proud of the release of BBC journalist Alan Johnston. But they must be judged by their actions, and there are discouraging signs. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights has reported several cases of abuse, kidnapping and torture by members of Hamas' Executive Force, and the death of a prisoner held by Hamas' military wing. It is true that these incidents do not occur in a vacuum -- Israel and its Fatah allies continue to engage in far more widespread murder, torture and kidnapping directed at Hamas members, and Hamas is engaged in a struggle for survival. But Hamas earned legitimacy by promising to end the ugly practices of Israeli-backed Fatah militias. It must fulfill that promise or see its hard-earned support disappear. At the same time it must begin to articulate a vision for the future that takes into account the reality of 11 million Israeli Jews and Palestinians living in a small country. We know what Hamas is against, but no one is clear what it is for.

Hamas is edging towards accepting a two-state solution just as the reality is beginning to dawn even on stalwarts of the Oslo peace process industry that the two-state solution, needed to save Israel as an enclave of Jewish privilege, is slipping out of reach. As a two-state solution "is becoming less likely," observes Aaron David Miller, a 25-year veteran of the State Department and senior Clinton Administration official at the 2000 Camp David summit, "there is more talk among Palestinians of a one-state solution -- which of course is not a solution at all, and which would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state." ("Is peace out of reach?," The Los Angeles Times, 15 July 2007).

Haaretz columnist Danny Rubinstein predicts that "sooner or later Hamas will fail in its war against Israel. But that [doesn't] mean that there will then be a return to the days of Oslo and the two-state vision." Rather, he fears, "there will be increasingly strong demands by Palestinian Arabs, who constitute almost half the inhabitants of this land, who will say: Under the present conditions we cannot establish a state of our own, and what remains for us is to demand civil rights in the country that is our homeland. They will adopt the slogans of the struggle of the Arabs who are Israeli citizens, who demand equality and the definition of Israel as a state of all its citizens." ("Nothing to sell the Palestinians," 16 July 2007). Thus we can see that Abbas is now Israel's last best hope in the struggle against democracy. Such a pathetic coalition cannot stand in the way of liberation.

Ali Abunimah is cofounder of The Electronic Intifada and author of One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse.

http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article7116.shtml