sabato 15 settembre 2007

No all'Università divisa per tribù

Sergio Luzzatto, Corriere della Sera, 15/09/07. I lettori del Corriere hanno appreso nei giorni scorsi del caso di Nadia Abu El-Haj, la docente della Columbia University di New York che rischia il posto per avere scritto un libro controverso sugli usi politici dell'archeologia nello Stato di Israele. Di origini palestinesi, questa studiosa di antropologia culturale, già vincitrice di onorificenze fra le più prestigiose del mondo accademico anglosassone, si trova oggi in una situazione simile a quella di Norman Finkelstein, lo studioso di origini ebraiche che accusa Israele di sfruttare la Shoah a fini politici, il quale ha dovuto recentemente dimettersi dalla De Paul University di Chicago. Una volta di più, il caso di Abu El-Haj pone il problema non soltanto della libertà di ricerca, ma della libertà di insegnamento nel nostro libero Occidente. Tale libertà non risulta più garantita, sempre e comunque, a professori che dedichino i loro studi ai temi più «sensibili» di storia e civiltà del Medio Oriente.
Non appare una soluzione accettabile del problema il sottoporre gli studiosi in questione a una sorta di plebiscito elettronico della corporazione universitaria, dove centinaia o migliaia di colleghi pronunciano con un clic il loro verdetto di assoluzione o di condanna.
Meno ancora appare una soluzione la scelta delle rispettive Università di sottoporre le carriere dei docenti «incriminati» al giudizio di commissioni ad hoc, formate secondo un criterio di appartenenza «etnica»: tanti colleghi «ebrei», tanti «musulmani », tanti «cristiani»… Dove andremo a finire, se la credibilità scientifica si riduce alla credibilità identitaria?

Al-Qassam made A military Maneuver yesterday preparing for any possible attack

Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades, 15/09/07. To send a message to the occupation forces that we are ready to any coming attack, Al-Qassam Brigades was making a military maneuver yesterday in the evening. Abu Obiada, the spokesman of Ezzdeen Al-Qassam Brigades stated yesterday that Al-Qassam Brigades is working day and night to defend any possible attack on the Gaza Strip. Dr.Nizar Rayan, the Hamas leader in northern Gaza Strip, was on the top of those who made the maneuver stressing that the leadership of Hamas movement will not flee during the attack but they will fight till the last drop of their blood.

Abu Obiada, the spokesman of Ezzdeen Al-Qassam Brigades, declared yesterday that Al-Qasam Brigades will be in a state of full alert against any possible Zionist aggression in the Gaza Strip.

Abu Obiada confirmed that Al-Qassam men are witnessing this gather on the borders of the Zionist sector and the willingness of the aggression during the large conspiracy, internal, external and Arab silence.

That came after the Zionist threats to have a big ground operation in the Gaza Strip in addition to a large scale bombardment on the Hamas establishment in the Gaza Strip as Hams controls the Gaza Strip since three months.

"The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy"

Jihad el-Khazen, Al-Hayat, 14/09/07. Twenty years before Mearsheimer and Walt published their work [The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy] , a book entitled They Dare to Speak out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby was published by Paul Findley, a Republican Congressman from the state of Illinois. When he called the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Jewish lobby brought him down after launching an open and bitter campaign against him.

I have the Arabic translation of Findley's original book They Dare to Speak out: the Zionist Lobby and America's Domestic and Foreign Policies. The author published another edition of his book with important additions in 2003, but they did not discuss in detail the activities of the Jewish lobby since the 1990s till now. The list of the lobby victims is long. I personally mention Senator Richard Percy, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who was surprised at the enormous clout of the lobby over American foreign policy. In a television program, he wondered how Israel and its prime minister can be stronger than the whole of Congress and the American president in directing American foreign policy.

Andrew Hurley published Holocaust II? Saving Israel from Suicide in 1990. He thinks that American support for radical Israeli policies will make Israel meet its doom. The book includes an abstract of one part of an old series of the Sixty Minutes television program that goes back to 1988. It discusses the lobby and its clout, and how it brought down congressmen like Findley, Percy, William Fulbright [Former United States Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated repeatedly in 1973, Israel controls the (U.S.) Senate.”], William Hathaway, and others.

In 1995 John Mulhall, a Catholic priest, published his book America and the Founding of Israel: an Investigation of the Morality of America's Role. Mulhall explains the role of American Zionists in making the United States endorse the creation of Israel in Palestine despite the opposition of thinkers and professional diplomats. The author examines the roles played by American presidents starting from Wilson and up to Truman. Finally, Mulhall came up with the conclusion that the United States is greatly indebted to the Palestinians.

Professor Mazin Qumsiyeh is one of the best Arab experts in the Jewish lobby and Israeli activities in the United States as he lives and work in it. In a recent article by him, he lists a number of books on the lobby, America, and Israel.

- An Alliance against Babylon: the United States, Israel, and Iraq was written by John Cooley whom I met when I worked for the Reuters News Agency in Beirut. Cooley is the correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor in the Middle East, and I find him one of the best American journalists who have worked in Beirut.

The book was published in 2005 and it is based on published and unpublished documents. He covers the history of Mesopotamia from the time of Babylon till today's Iraq. There is also a chapter on American aid to Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran and its dealing with Iran at the same time so that the two parties persist in killing each other. The final chapter discusses the occupation of Iraq and asks if the country will end up as a democracy or as a partitioned entity, and it also discusses the role of the Israeli intelligence in paving the way for partition, and the relations between Israel and the Kurds and Turkey.

- The Power of Israel in the United States by James Petras, published in 2006, includes significant examples on the Israeli role in seeking a war with Iraq. Then it examines the issue of American oil companies and says that their interests are jeopardized if the United States prevents them from doing business with Iran and if the United States engages in wars on behalf of Israel.

- The Host and the Parasite - How Israel's Fifth Column Consumed America, by Greg Felton, was published in 2007. The book comprises consolidated details on the conspiracies of the lobby, of Israeli terror, and on Israel's role in massacres like Qana, Sabra and Shatila, along with explanations on how the lobby controls the United States that in turn controls the United Nations and international organizations. The book also offers an interesting explanation of the work done by pro-Israeli research centers, such as The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, The Washington Institute for the Near East, The New Century American Plan, and The American Enterprise Institute. Each of these institutions has played a role in involving the Bush administration in the war against Iraq.

These books are important and useful. The common denominator to them is that big publishing houses declined to publish them, so the authors resorted to small or specialized ones. The book written by Mearsheimer and Walt remains one of the most important books on the Israeli lobby and the direction of American foreign policy against the interests of the United States. However, I need to conclude with President Jimmy Carter's book Palestine: Peace not Apartheid. The book has faced a fierce campaign by the lobby and Israel's supporters who have tried to deny the racism of the occupation. Yet, this campaign has done a service to the book by making a bestseller in America. President Carter has resisted the campaign and replied in a convincing manner, which earned him more fans.

http://www.j-khazen.blogspot.com/

A clash of wills

Saleh Al-Naami, Al-Ahram weekly, 13-19/09/07. Hassan Al-Masri, who works in one of the civil institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA), feared that Fayyad's government would suspend his pay if he did not participate in the Friday prayer in the open. Activists in the Fatah movement had spread rumours to that effect among employees and staff of various PA departments. He was relieved when he realised that -- at least in the area in which he lives -- the call of the PLO factions found a response from only some youth.

Yet it was not pure rumour. The Ramallah government had suspended the salaries of employees who refused to comply with calls for strikes organised by syndicates connected to Fatah in protest against Hamas assuming executive power.

Rasmiya Awaydi, 52, works as a nurse in the Dar Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. She told Al-Ahram Weekly that after 30 years of continual service in nursing, the Fayyad government suspended her salary simply because she refused to comply with the strike in the health sector. "It was an extremely cruel moment for me," she said. "Should I comply with a strike that affects people but has no relation to professional demands so as to guarantee that I continue to receive my salary, or respond to my conscience and remain by the side of patients?"

All signs indicate that the Fayyad government is exploiting its ability to guarantee employee salaries in order to enlist them in protest activities against Hamas, whose government can only guarantee a third of employee salaries.

Mustafa Al-Barghouti, a representative in the Palestinian Legislative Council and former Palestinian minister of information, says that he daily receives hundreds of communications from employees and members of the security agencies informing him that the Fayyad government has suspended their pay for no apparent reason. Barghouti asserts that there is talk of tens of thousands of employees who have been punished without committing any wrongdoing. "The Fayyad government must show the legal basis on which it has suspended the salaries of tens of thousands of employees, many of whom were appointed before the latest legislative elections took place and whose families are suffering badly due to a lack of income and their livelihood being cut off, especially as we are nearing the start of the blessed month of Ramadan," he told the Weekly.

For its part, the Fayyad government has admitted that in August alone it halted the salaries of 9,000 employees. During a hearing held by the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights in Ramallah last Sunday, Sadi Al-Kernz, secretary-general of Fayyad's cabinet, said that the decisions to dismiss employees or suspend their salaries came as part of government policy for reforming employment.

The Fayyad government has been careful to invest in areas where Hamas is deemed weak. This approach has not been limited to the exploitation of its virtual monopoly of financial affairs, but has gone as far as an attempt to create a wider political front to counter Hamas by reviving the framework of the PLO in Gaza. Last week, President Mahmoud Abbas made a decision to consider PLO factions a "commission for national activity". This decision has been viewed as an attempt by Abbas to firmly establish PLO factions as an alternative to Hamas in the Strip, the agreement of leftist PLO factions to join this commission interpreted as bias towards the interests of Fatah as opposed to Hamas.

Barghouti warns Abbas of falling into the "trap set by Israel and the American administration". The former Palestinian minister of information added: "Abbas will be shocked by the bitter reality awaiting him at the autumn meeting, for they will only discuss the means of carrying out PA reforms, and there won't be any serious discussion of seeking an end to the occupation."

For its part, Israel has its own idea about the future of the Gaza Strip. Last Monday, Israeli radio lifted the veil from a plan prepared by the Department of Planning and Research in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs that calls for the appointment of a "foreign mandate government" to administer Gazan affairs following the collapse of the Hamas central government. The plan calls for tightening the grip on crossings and limiting the quantities of goods entering the Gaza Strip to the least amount possible. This is in addition to the imposition of restrictions on the transfer of funds to the Strip, all with the aim of expediting the fall of Hamas.

The plan also recommends that Israel stipulate that Abbas firmly establish the separation of the West Bank and Gaza before it agrees to enter into dialogue with him. Israeli radio noted that Olmert, who is convinced of the plan, clarified last week to Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Massimo D'Alema, that Israel rejects the Italian position calling for the formation of a Palestinian national unity government. In light of the extremely complicated current situation in Gaza, the leadership of Hamas has recently grown convinced that it is no longer possible to avoid the responsibility of proposing a serious political initiative to end to the internal Palestinian crisis.

Al-Ahram Weekly exclusively obtained a draft of the initiative prepared by the Hamas Political Committee and which Hamas intends to submit to Abbas indirectly. The initiative states that Hamas is prepared to place all security and presidential headquarters and border crossings temporarily under Egyptian command, until they are handed over to official security agencies that the initiative stresses must be restructured on a "national and professional" basis, and for whom a referential authority must be determined.

The initiative also calls for the formation of a central government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the same programmes as those of the national unity government, and which would comply with the Cairo and Mecca agreements with regard to the future of the PLO. The initiative stresses the necessity of applying the Cairo understandings related to this issue, and the setting of a timetable for holding parliamentary elections. It also stresses the necessity of reconsidering all executive decrees issued by Abbas since Hamas confronted Fatah militarily.

In all cases, it is the Palestinian citizen who continues to pay the price as Fatah and President Abbas, on the one hand, and the Hamas movement on the other, seek to gain points in the clash of wills ongoing between them.

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Articles of faith

Ed Pilkington, Guardian, 15/09/07. When two eminent US scholars wrote about the 'Israel lobby' they were vilified by colleagues and the Washington Post. This week Barack Obama joined the attack. It is notable that none of the candidates standing for [US] president in 2008 have a word of criticism for Israeli state behaviour; this week Barack Obama pulled an advert for his campaign from the Amazon page selling The Israel Lobby, denouncing the book as "just wrong". So what happened to America's commitment to free speech, the First Amendment? "We knew from De Tocqueville this country is driven by conformity," Judt [a [Jewish] British-born historian at New York University, Tony Judt, has been warned off or disinvited from four academic events in the past year. On one occasion, he was asked to promise not to mention Israel in a speech on the Holocaust. He refused.] says. "The law can't make people speak out - it can only prevent people from stopping free speech. What's happened is not censorship, but self-censorship." Judt believes that a few well-organised groups including Aipac have succeeded in proscribing debate. He recalls a prominent Democratic senator confiding to him that he would never criticise Israel in public. "He told me that if he did so, for the rest of his career he would never be able to get a majority for what he cared about. He would be cut off at the knees."

Bil'in! Bil'in!


Uri Avnery, Gush Shalom, 08/09/07. WHEN MY friends fall prey to despair, I show them a piece of painted concrete, which I bought in Berlin. It is one of the remnants of the Berlin wall, which are on sale in the city. I tell them that I intend, when the time comes, to apply for a franchise to sell pieces of the Separation Wall. Sometimes, when I give a lecture before a German audience, I ask: "How many of you believed, a week before the fall of the wall, that this would happen in their lifetime?" No one has ever raised their hand. But the Berlin wall fell. This week it happened here, too - true, only in one place, to a small section of the fence, when the Supreme Court decided that the government must dismantle the obstacle (which at this place consists of a fence, with ditches, patrol roads and razor wire) and relocate it nearer to the
Palestinian Prime Minister Fayad among the marchers
Green Line.

THE BIBLE commands us: "Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth, and let not thine heart be glad when he stumbleth" (Proberbs 24,17). It is a very hard commandment to obey.

The enemy, in this case, is the "Separation Obstacle". It is hard not to rejoice, even when it is a limited joy, a conditional joy, because we have won a battle, not the campaign.

First of all, a part of the land of Bil'in has been redeemed, but not all of it. The new fence will still be far from the Green Line. The length of the section to be dismantled is less than two kilometers.

Human rights activist Mustapha Barghouti
carried on the shoulders of a dancing demonstrators

Second, Bil'in is only one of many villages whose land has been stolen by means of the wall.

Third, the wall is only one of the means of occupation, and the occupation gets worse by the day.

Fourth, in many other places the Supreme Court has confirmed the path of the fence, even though it steals Palestinian land no less than at Bil'in.

Fifth, the Bil'in decision also has a negative side: it gives the court an alibi in the eyes of the world. It confers on the settlers an apparent legitimacy in many other places. It must not be forgotten for a moment that the Supreme Court is essentially an instrument of the occupation, even though it tries sometimes to mitigate it.

As if to underline this point, the court itself hastened this week to issue another ruling, giving retroactive authorization to another neighborhood that has also been built on Bil'in land.

Yet in spite of all this: in this desperate struggle, even a small victory is a big victory. Especially since it happened in Bil'in.

FOR BIL'IN is a symbol. In the past two and a half years, it has become a part of our life.

Here, every Friday, for 135 weeks without exception, a demonstration against the fence has taken place.

What is so special about Bil'in, a small and remote village, whose name was known before to just a few outsiders, if any?

The struggle there has become a symbol because of an unusual combinations of traits:

A- STEADFASTNESS. The courage of the Bil'iners. In other villages, too, the demonstrators have shown courage, but here the sheer dogged persistence arouses admiration. Week after week they came back. The activists were arrested again and again, wounded more than once. The entire village has suffered from the terrorism of the occupation authorities.

More than once I was stirred at the sight of this small village's resistance. I saw the armored jeeps storming in, sirens screeching hysterically, the heavily armed policemen jumping out and throwing gas and stun grenades in all directions, young boys stopping the jeeps with their bodies.

B- PARTNERSHIP. The three-cornered partnership between the people of the village, Israeli peace activists and representatives of international solidarity.

This is a kind of partnership that is not expressed in highfaluting speeches or sterile meetings in luxury hotels abroad. It was forged under clouds of choking tear gas, under the jets of water cannons, under fire from stun grenades and rubber-coated steel bullets, and in ambulances of the Red Crescent as well as army detention facilities. It has given birth to comradeship and mutual trust, just when these seemed to have been lost forever in our country.

Since the death of Yasser Arafat, cooperation between Palestinians and Israeli peace movements has declined in several spheres. Many Palestinians have despaired of the Israelis, who have not achieved the hoped-for change, and many Israeli peace activists have despaired in face of the Palestinian reality. But in Bil'in cooperation has flourished.

The Israeli activists, headed by the resolute young women and men of the "Anarchists Against the Fence", have proved to the Palestinians that they have an Israeli partner they can trust, and the people of Bil'in have proved to their Israeli friends that they are reliable and determined partners. I am proud of the part Gush Shalom has played in this struggle.

Now the court has proved that such demonstrations, which many considered hopeless, can indeed bear fruit.

C- NON-VIOLENCE. Always and everywhere. Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King would have been proud of such disciples.

The non-violence was entirely on the side of the demonstrators. I can testify as an eye-witness: in all the demonstrations in which I took part, I saw not a single instance of a demonstrator raising a hand against a soldier or policeman. When in one of the protests stones were thrown from among the protesters, video films conclusively proved that they were thrown by undercover policemen.

True, there was violence at the demonstrations. A lot of violence. But it came from the soldiers and the border-policemen who could not bear, I presume, the sight of Palestinians and Israelis acting together.

Generally, it happened like this: The demonstrators marched together from the center of the village towards the fence. In front there marched young men and women wearing or carrying symbols of non-violence. On one occasion, they were handcuffed to each other, another time they were holding high portraits of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, another time they were carried in cages - imagination and creativity were given free rein. Sometimes well-known personalities marched in front, arms locked.

Near the fence, a large contingent of soldiers and border-policemen were waiting for them, wearing helmets and bullet-proof vests and armed with rifles and grenade launchers, with handcuffs and sticks dangling from their belts. The protesters did not stop but advanced towards the gate, banging on it, shaking it, waving flags and shouting slogans. The soldiers opened fire with gas and stun grenades and rubber-coated steel bullets. Some protesters sat down on the ground, others retreated and then came back again and again. Some were dragged away with their bare backs scraping along the road and the rocks, choking on the gas. Arrests were made. Wounds were treated.

When the demonstration came to a close and the participants headed back towards the village, the local boys would start to sling stones at the soldiers, who responded with rubber bullets. Chases took place between the olive trees, with the light footed boys generally having the advantage.

Sometimes, the stone-slinging started even earlier, when the boys saw from afar the concentration of forces lurking in the village groves and the demonstrators being dragged brutally towards the army vehicles. But, in accordance with the standing agreement among themselves, the protesters never joined in the violence, not even when they were dragged on the rock-strewn ground or were kicked and beaten while lying there.

This combination of steadfastness, partnership and non-violence is what turned Bil'in into a beacon of the struggle against the occupation.

THE BIL'IN affair has another face, which was revealed in all its ugliness over the last few weeks.

The Supreme Court has decided that the path of the fence in this sector was not based on security considerations, but was designed to enlarge the settlement. For us, of course, that was not a startling revelation. Everyone who has been there, including foreign diplomats, has seen it with their own eyes: the path was fixed in such a way that the Bil'in land was annexed de facto to Israel, to serve for a huge new housing project called "Matityahu East", in addition to the settlement called Matityahu (and also Modi'in Illit and Kiryat Sefer) that is already standing.

In a second decision this week, the Supreme Court, for the sake of a spurious "balance", decided that the housing project that is already standing in Matityahu, also on Bil'in land, can remain there and may now be populated, in spite of the fact that the same court has in the past forbidden this.

And who built Matityahu?

Some weeks ago, a huge scandal was exposed. The culprit is a building company called Heftsiba. It collapsed, taking with it the apartments that its clients had already paid for. Many of them have lost their entire savings.

The owner of the company fled and was tracked down in Italy. The company's debts come close to a billion dollars. The police suspects that the fugitive has stolen immense sums.

And lo and behold: this is the same company that built the original Matityahu neighborhood, and that intended to build the new Matityahu project on land stolen by means of the "Security Fence". It also built the monstrous Har Homa housing project and other neighborhoods in the occupied territories.

Who can now deny what we have been saying for years, that the settlements are a huge business of billions upon billions of dollars, which is entirely based on stolen property?

Everybody knows the hard core of settlers, nationalist-messianic fanatics, who are ready to drive out, kill and rob, because their God told them so. But around this core has gathered a large group of gangsters, real estate operators, who conduct their dirty and hugely profitable business behind the screen of patriotism. In this case, patriotism is indeed the refuge of scoundrels.

Talia Sasson, a lawyer appointed at the time by the government to investigate the setting up of "illegal" settlement outposts, has concluded that most of the ministries and army commands have violated the law and secretly cooperated with the settlers. It may appear that they acted out of patriotic sentiments. I have my doubts. I dare to guess that there must be hundreds of politicians, officials and officers who have received large bribes from businessmen who made billions from these "patriotic" transactions.

P.S.:

The man who invented the wall was Haim Ramon, then a leader of the Labor Party. Ramon started out as one of the "doves' of the party (when that was popular). Later he jumped ship to the Kadima Party (when that was profitable).

This week Ramon proposed cutting off the electricity that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, as punishment for the Qassam rockets fired at Sderot. It must be remembered that from the beginning of the occupation, Israeli governments have prevented the setting up of independent water and electricity works there, so as to make sure that the Strip would be completely dependent on Israel in matters of life and death.

Now Ramon proposes cutting off this lifeline, to plunge Gaza into darkness, to stop electricity for hospitals and refrigerators, as a collective punishment - which constitutes a war crime. His government has accepted the proposal in principle.

If Bil'in represents the struggle of the Sons of Light, Ramon surely represents - quite literally - the Sons of Darkness.


(Report on and photos of the victory demonstration that took place in Bil'in this Friday can be viewed on Gush Shalom's website).

venerdì 14 settembre 2007

Defend the Palestinian cause against its most unreasonable supporters

Hussein Ibish, The Daily Star, 14/09/07. In the United States a small but vocal group of left-wing commentators has reacted by defending Hamas and heaping vitriol on Fatah. However well-intentioned, their rhetoric, or more significantly what it advocates, might significantly undermine efforts to help to end the occupation. Such support for the Muslim far right is symptomatic of a broad trend in Arab leftist circles. Some in the Arab left have, in effect, abandoned many of the left's traditional values, including class analysis and a materialist program for social change, secularism and iconoclasm, feminism and the cause of women's rights, and internationalism. What remains intact is Arab nationalism, suspicion of the West, and hatred of Israel. There are still many honorable pockets of bona fide leftist thinking in the Arab world. However, some Arab leftists now find themselves reading politics mainly through the lens of ethnic nationalism, an orientation now dominated by Islamist organizations. Thus, Islamist groups can seem appealing to those on the left. What gets lost or ignored in the process is the far right's reactionary, repressive and theocratic agenda.

In the United States, the most strident of these voices are Columbia University professor Joseph Massad, Asaad AbuKhalil of California State University, Stanislaus, and Ali Abunimah and others writing on the Electronic Intifada Web site.

Massad has drawn an extended analogy comparing Hamas to the deposed and murdered Chilean leftist President Salvador Allende, and Fatah to the fascist dictator Augusto Pinochet. When someone on the left starts looking at Khaled Meshaal and seeing Salvador Allende, their moral and political compass may be so badly broken that there is little hope for them to ever find their way back. Similarly, Abunimah has repeatedly compared Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Nicaraguan Contras, arguing: "These are Palestinian Contras."

Rather than seeing the obvious shortcomings on both sides, these writers insist that the fault line is between a gang of traitors on the one hand and the defenders of Palestine on the other.

Massad has passionately defended Hamas' extremely violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, for example, claiming that Fatah had "pushed it into a corner in the hope of slaughtering all its leadership in Gaza" and that, therefore, Hamas "could not but defend itself against their final onslaught." In May 2006, AbuKhalil urged Hamas to "to pre-empt their enemies if they want to rule," anticipating the bloody scenes in Gaza over a year later. And Abunimah has gone so far as to accuse Fatah of waging a "war against the Palestinian people."

Massad takes every opportunity to suggest that Hamas and democracy are organically linked, declaring that "the supporters of Hamas, whether believers or atheists or secularists or Islamists, are the supporters of the real Palestinian democracy because Hamas' struggle is a struggle against dictatorial traitors (under the legal definition of treason)." However, when it was obvious that Mahmoud Abbas was about to be elected Palestinian president in January 2005, Abunimah's Web site published several articles questioning the possibility of democracy under occupation and arguing that "the elections are a liability for the Palestinians."

Electronic Intifada then published "The False Promise of Western Democracy," which claimed that the election of Abbas "added to a growing worldwide skepticism about Western notions of democracy (i.e. institutionalized suffrage, parliamentary procedures, etc.)." The article affirmed that "the value of Western democracy is questionable for the Palestinian people" and condemned the international community for "an invasive imposition of democratic practices" on the Palestinians.

There were no articles to this effect following the Hamas parliamentary victory.

The rationalization many of these commentators offer to explain Palestinian support for Fatah and opposition to Hamas is that it is the fruit of willful wickedness and greed. Singled out for special condemnation has been the beloved Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, who Massad frankly accuses of being an intellectual prostitute: "Perhaps Mahmoud Darwish's recent poem in support of the coup published on the front page of the Saudi newspaper Al-Hayat, can be explained by the monthly checks he receives from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority, and he is not alone."

AbuKhalil claims that Darwish supports Fatah only because the "Oslo regime gave him a nice house in Ramallah." He added that, "I expect [Darwish] to declare [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert the 'knight of Zionism' any day now," and that Darwish's recent poetry reading in Haifa was properly translated as: "I want Nobel. Please give me Nobel. I really want Nobel. Please give it to me NOW. If you give me Nobel, I will keep repeating that Arabs are in love with Israeli nuclear weapons."

These hyperbolic and hyper-personalized attacks on Darwish typify the approach to Palestinian politics that has been developed by some leftist and secular defenders of Hamas. These accusations can border on incitement to violence. What is to be done to those condemned, as Massad put it, "under the legal definition of treason?"

Those presently inclined to be sympathetic to Hamas need to step back and ask themselves: Are we really laboring to support the creation of another theocracy in the Middle East? Would we want to live in such a society? Is that what liberation looks like?

An approach that simply condemns Israel and the US, now lamentably extended to include, and even focus on, other Palestinians and Arabs, is trapped in the limitations of its own negativity. By offering nothing of positive value, this method functions as a terribly weak argument for ending the occupation. Any successful approach to pro-Palestinian advocacy in the United States should therefore emphasize the benefits to the United States, and indeed to Israel, of freedom for the Palestinian people. The Palestinians cannot achieve their aims without international backing that applies pressure on Israel and that provides the context and support that a workable agreement and a fledgling state would obviously require. This is why Hamas' policies that reject international law outright are so damaging to the Palestinian cause.

Therefore, building international support to end the occupation must be the principal aim above all in the US. The single greatest tool for this that Palestinian- and Arab-Americans have is their citizenship. Their primary task is to engage the political system nationally and the policy conversation as it is taking place in Washington. A politically receivable message is urgently required. This could emphasize the benefits to American policy goals in the region generally, reducing the appeal of anti-American extremism in the region, enhancing the US role as a responsible world leader, the promotion of American values such as independence and citizenship, and economic benefits to the region and to the US.

Palestinian-Americans have to recognize that their traditional approaches have failed and see the poverty and pointlessness of a purely negative agenda of condemnation without positive content. The keys to success are to take much better advantage of our status as Americans, develop new and effective forms of advocacy, and forge the alliances that can actually achieve results.

Hussein Ibish is a senior fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine (ATFP) in Washington. He wrote this commentary, of which a much longer version can be accessed on the ATFP Web site (www.ATFP.net), for THE DAILY STAR.

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Palestinian Public Opinion Poll 6-8 September 2007

While Three Quarters of the Palestinians Reject Hamas’s Military Action in the Gaza Strip and While Fateh and President Mahmud Abbas Gain Popular Support as a Result of Hamas’s Step, and While a Majority Supports the Presidential Decree Regarding Election Law and Supports Early Elections, 40% Want the Government of Ismail Haniyeh to Stay in Power and Half of Gazans Feel They and Their Families are Secure and Safe in Their Homes. Only one quarter (26%) of the public expects the November peace conference called for by the US to succeed and 67% expect it to fail in making progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during September 6-8, 2007. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. This poll release covers three issues: Hamas’s military action in the Gaza Strip, elections and balance of power, and the peace process. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that only one fifth of the Palestinians supports Hamas’s military takeover of the Gaza Strip and that Fateh and PA President Mahmud Abbas have benefited from Hamas’s step as their popularity has increased significantly. Moreover, a majority supports the recently released presidential decree regarding election law and supports holding early elections. Findings show that a larger percentage of the public blames Hamas rather than Fateh for the problems confronting the Gaza Strip such as the closure of the Rafah Crossing and the electricity cutoff. A large percentage accepts the position of the PA president regarding resumption of dialogue with Hamas while a much smaller percentage supports the position of Hamas regarding dialogue. Nonetheless, the drop in Hamas’s popularity is not big; indeed, 40% of the public wants the government of Ismail Haniyeh to stay in office and half of the Gazans say their security and personal safety and that of their families are now assured.

Hamas’s Military Takeover of the Gaza Strip:

· 22% support and 73% oppose Hamas’s military takeover of the Gaza Strip. Support for Hamas’s military action reaches 31% in the Gaza Strip compared to 17% in the West Bank.

· 40% agree and 52% disagree that Haniyeh’s government should stay in office despite dismissal by the president. 32% evaluate the performance of the Haniyeh government as good or very good and 43% think it is bad or very bad.

· By contrast, 49% agree and 44% disagree that the government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad should stay in office. Positive evaluation of the Fayyad government reaches 44% and negative evaluation 28%.

· 30% view the Haniyeh government as the legitimate PA government while 38% view the Fayyad government as the legitimate one and 22% believe both governments are illegitimate. Belief in the legitimacy of Haniyeh’s government increases in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (27%) and belief in the legitimacy of the Fayyad government is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

· In the battle over hearts and minds in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the largest percentage (45%) does not trust the media of Hamas/Haniyeh or Fateh/Fayyad and only 19% trust the media of Hamas/Haniyeh while 27% trust the media of Fateh/Fayyad. Trust in Hamas/Haniyeh’s media increases in the Gaza Strip (27%) compared to the West Bank (15%). Similarly, trust in Fateh/Fayyad media increases in the Gaza Strip (30%) compared to the West Bank (25%). In the West Bank, 50% say they do not trust either media.

· The party most responsible for the closure of the Rafah Crossing is Israel in the eyes of 41% of the Palestinians, Hamas in the eyes of 26%, Fateh in the eyes of 15%, and Egypt in the eyes of 2%. Blaming Hamas for the closure of the Rafah Crossing increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (22%). Similarly, blaming Fateh increases in the Gaza Strip (19%) compared to the West Bank (12%).

· The largest percentage (43%) blames Israel for the recent electricity cutoff in the Gaza Strip while 23% blame Hamas,18% blame Abbas/Salam Fayyad, and 10% blame the European Union. Blaming Hamas and Fateh increases in the Gaza Strip (29% and 22% respectively) while blaming Israel increases in the West Bank (49%) compared to the Gaza Strip (32%).

· The largest percentage (33%) believes that the top priority for the Fayyad government should be the enforcement of law and order and ending lawlessness followed by conducting political reforms and fighting corruption (22%), and ending international sanctions and return to the peace process (18% each).

· The largest percentage (29%) expects the unification of the two authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within months and 19% expect it within a year or two. On the other hand, 20% believe unification will not take place in the next two years and 22% believe that the separation will become permanent. In other words, 48% expect unification within the next two years and 42% do not expect unification in the future or near future. Optimism about unification within the next two years increases in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (42%).

· To end the current crisis between Fateh and Hamas, 27% accept Hamas’s view which calls for unconditional dialogue with President Abbas based on the exiting status quo today and 46% accept Abbas’s and Fateh’s view which calls for a dialogue but only after Hamas transfers control over the security headquarters to its rightful owners and return to the status quo ante. Support for Hamas’s position increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (24%) and support for Abbas/Fateh’s position increases also in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (44%). About one quarter (24%) opposes both views.

· Among all respondents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, only 8% evaluate the situation in the Gaza Strip as good or very good while 27% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good.

· West Bank-Gaza Strip public expectations regarding future conditions in the Gaza Strip tend to be pessimistic while expectations regarding future conditions in the West Bank tend to show some optimism. For example, while only 21% expect economic conditions to improve in the Gaza Strip, 56% expect these conditions to improve in the West Bank. Moreover, while only 28% expect conditions of democracy, freedom of speech and press will improve in the Gaza Strip, 47% expect these conditions to improve in the West Bank. In general, residents of the Gaza Strip tend to show more optimism regarding conditions in their area as well as in the West Bank while residents of the West Bank tend to show less optimism regarding conditions in both areas.

· 41% say they feel their security and personal safety and those of their family are assured today and 59% say they are not assured. Feelings of security and safety increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (35%). The results regarding security and safety reflect significant increase compared to the situation in mid June when it reached 41% in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank.

· Percentage of those wishing to immigrate to other countries continues to increase from 28% last June to 32% in this poll. The percentage is higher in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to West Bank (29%).

Presidential Decree on Elections, Early Elections, and Balance of Power:

· 58% support and 34% oppose the most recent presidential decree regarding the amendment to the electoral system basing it on proportional representation with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip becoming one electoral district and with the distribution of seats reflecting the percentage of popular vote received in the whole country.

· Moreover, 62% support and 32% oppose eligibility conditions imposed by the decree on candidate lists wishing to participate in elections including their commitments to the PLO, the Declaration of Independence, and the Basic Law. A similar percentage (61%) accepts and 32% oppose the application of this eligibility condition on candidates for the presidential elections.

· Less than two years after the last legislative elections, 32% say that the lists and candidates they voted for in the last elections no longer represent them and 63% say they still represent them.

· Support for early elections reaches 62% and opposition 33%. Support increases in the Gaza Strip (65%) compared to the West Bank (60%).

· Popularity of Hamas drops to 31% losing two percentage points compared to its popularity in mid June and six percentage points compared to mid March. The popularity of Fateh increases from 43% three months ago to 48% in this poll. It is noticeable that this is the first time since the January 2006 elections, when it won 42% of the vote, that Fateh’s popularity has significantly increased. The popularity of all the third parties combined reaches 11%, and 10% remain undecided. Hamas’s and Fateh’s popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (36% and 51% respectively) and decreases in the West Bank (28% and 47% respectively).

· If new presidential elections took place today and the only two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the percentage of non participation would reach 38%. From among those willing to participate, 59% say they will vote for Abbas, 36% say they will vote for Haniyeh, and 5% remain undecided. If the competition is between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, nonparticipation would drop to 29% and from among those willing to participate, 63% say they will vote for Barghouti, 32% say they will vote for Haniyeh, and 5% remain undecided. These results indicate a significant increase in the percentage of those voting for Abbas compared to the situation in mid June when it reached 49% compared to 42% for Haniyeh. Moreover, vote for Barghouti increases in this poll compared to where it was last June when it stood at 59% compared to 35% for Haniyeh.

· Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas increases from 36% last June to 45% in this poll.

Peace Process:

· Only one quarter (26%) of the public expects the November peace conference called for by the US to succeed and 67% expect it to fail in making progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

· 57% agree and 41% disagree with the proposed two-state solution whereby Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis recognize Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the solution of all the issues of the conflict.

· Similarly, 58% support and 37% oppose conducting negotiations with the aim of establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel on the permanent issues such as the permanent borders, holy places and refugees.

· But only 46% would support and 48% would oppose a permanent settlement of the borders of the Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with the exception of settlements in about 5% of the West Bank where a swap would take place with Palestinians receiving an equal amount of territories from Israel proper. Support for this settlement increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (42%).

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This PSR survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah.


New UN report highlights conflict over resources in West Bank


HEBRON HILLS, WEST BANK, 11 September 2007 (IRIN) - Israeli settlements in the West Bank are having a severe humanitarian impact on rural Palestinian areas, according to a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on 30 August.

Photo: Shabtai Gold/IRIN

A Palestinian girl returns home to Um al Khir from school. Many students study by the light of the neighbouring settlement as they lack electricity. The Palestinians were not allowed to install the network which would allow the electricity to be distributed to their homes.


The settlements disconnect Palestinians from agricultural land and limit their movement, restricting access to markets and water resources, the report, entitled The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Infrastructure in the West Bank, said.

In the southern Hebron Hills area a conflict between Israeli settlers and Palestinians over land and water resources is apparent. Palestinian residents in interviews with IRIN described the harsh impact the settlements have on their daily lives.

Water

In the small village of Um al Khir, near the Carmel settlement, the residents receive water through an old military above-ground network of thin pipes which, they say, does not meet their needs and which they cannot refurbish. They supplement this with expensive water brought in by tankers. The Israeli settlers are connected to the mains network. "The settlers' chicken huts have running water and electricity," Sheikh Khalil Hathallia, a resident, told IRIN.

According to the Oslo Accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, the latter received nearly six times more aquifer water than was allocated for the Palestinians, OCHA said.

Furthermore, the report states, West Bank Palestinian water consumption per person is considerably lower than standards set by the World Health Organization.

Shlomo Dror, a spokesman for the Israeli Ministry of Defence, said that according to the Oslo Accords, Israel was required to increase the amount of water allocated to the Palestinians by three percent each year.

"In fact, in the last year, for example, we increased the allocation by eight percent," he said.

He also said the Palestinians needed to invest in water purification systems to maximize the use of the water they do have.

Slow shrinking of grazing areas

However, for the villagers in Um al Khir, the fight over resources has led to house demolitions and a slow shrinking of grazing and agricultural areas.
"Now it costs us much more. We need to buy fodder instead of grazing our animals," said Hathallia, noting the growing size of the Israeli settlement.

His neighbour and fellow tribesman, Sliman Hathallia, said his land had been taken in recent years by settlers. He pointed out their new homes. "By 2006, they had totally grabbed all the [my] land," he said.

He said there were also violent confrontations with the settlers as well as with soldiers.

"My wife was injured by the army while they demolished homes here last February," he said, producing medical documents appearing to indicate she now suffered from heart problems and had had a nervous breakdown due to the stress caused.

The homes were destroyed for not having permits from the Israeli Civil Administration.

Similarly, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) set up generators in the village, but the Palestinians were not allowed to install the network which would allow the electricity to be distributed to their homes.

"I won't leave here. If they want me to move, I'll do it, but only if I can go back to Tel Arad," Sliman said, referring to the village where he was born in what is now Israel.

All of the residents of Um al Khir are refugees from the 1948 war, registered with UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees.

Susya village

A similar situation exists in Susya, a small Palestinian village further south.

All the residents are internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 1985, the Israeli authorities declared their land an archaeological zone, and they had to move to nearby land. They now say settlers are trying to squeeze them out of their new village.

"We had to buy back our water from the [Israeli] settlement. We can't access our land near the settlements. Then the settlers come and work the land. They are trying to take it over and the army doesn't stop them." Muhammed Nawaja from Susya

I
n the new Susya they are not allowed to build houses, so they live in tents and other temporary structures.

Water here becomes a precious commodity between the months of July and October, when the cisterns, filled by rainwater, run low. Residents say settler security forces keep them from accessing many of their wells and then use the water for themselves.

"We had to buy back our water from the [Israeli] settlement," Muhammed Nawaja, a resident, said with a sigh.

"We can't access our land near the settlements. Then the settlers come and work the land. They are trying to take it over and the army doesn't stop them."

Dror, who admits there is an ongoing conflict over land, said Israel cracks down on illegal acts by settlers and does not distinguish between Jews and Palestinians. "And the Palestinians always have the option of going to the Israeli High Court to contest land claims," he said.

Recently, the court ordered the state to dismantle an 80cm-high wall in the area which had prevented Palestinians from accessing grazing land.

"That whole story, which we said was illegal, led to a waste of about US$20 million," said a UN aid worker who preferred anonymity, noting how that money could have helped poor Palestinians.

Israel, as opposed to the international community, does not view its settlements as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention as it maintains the West Bank is not occupied land.

Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) Continue Systematic Attacks on Palestinian Civilians and Property in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT)


Palestinian Center for Human Rights. Weekly Report. 06-12/08/07.




IOF Prevents Muslim from Worship in Hebron’s Ibrahimi Mosque at the Start of the Holy Month of Ramadan



· 6 Palestinians, including 2 children, were killed by IOF.

· 23 Palestinians, including 9 children, were wounded by IOF.

· IOF conducted 35 incursions into Palestinian communities in the West Bank and 3 ones into the Gaza Strip.

· IOF arrested 54 Palestinian civilians in the West Bank and 6 ones in the Gaza Strip.

· IOF razed 81 donums[1] of agricultural land in the Gaza Strip.

· IOF will close the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron during the holiday Ramadan Month for 5 sporadic days.

· IOF raided the local council of Bir Nabala village, north of Jerusalem.

· IOF have continued to impose a total siege on the OPT.

· IOF have isolated the Gaza Strip from the outside world and a humanitarian crisis has emerged.

· IOF troops arrested 2 Palestinian civilians at checkpoints in the West Bank.

Summary

Israeli violations of international law and humanitarian law continued in the OPT during the reporting period (6 – 12 September 2007):

Shooting: During the reporting period, IOF killed 6 Palestinians, including 2 children, and wounded 23 others, including 9 children, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In the Gaza Strip, on 6 September 2007, IOF killed 4 members of the Palestinian resistance and wounded 10 others in al-Qarara village, northeast of Khan Yunis. Members of the Palestinian resistance resisted an incursion by IOF into the village and clashed with IOF troops. On 8 September 2007, IOF shot dead a Palestinian child who was hunting birds near Karni crossing, east of Gaza City. Additionally, 5 Palestinian civilians, including 3 children and a woman, were wounded when IOF fired a missile at the apartment building where they live.

In the West Bank, on 6 September 2007, IOF moved into Jenin to arrest allegedly wanted Palestinians. IOF troops opened fire at a number of Palestinian children who demonstrated against this incursion. As a result, two children were wounded. One of these children died from his wound on 10 September 2007. On 8 September 2007, a Palestinian civilian was wounded in ‘Azzoun village, east of Qalqilya, when he mishandled a sound bomb of the remainders of IOF. On 10 September 2007, an IOF undercover unit fired from inside a car at a Palestinian who was walking near the entrance of ‘Ein Beit al-Maa’ refugee camp, west of Nablus. He was wounded to the feet and IOF troops arrested him. On 11 September 2007, 5 Palestinian children were wounded by IOF in Jenin town and refugee camp.

Incursions: During the reporting period, IOF conducted at least 35 military incursions into Palestinian communities in the West Bank. During those incursions, IOF arrested 54 Palestinian civilians, including 3 children and a woman. Thus, the number of Palestinians arrested by IOF in the West Bank since the beginning of this year has mounted to 1,931. Also during these incursions, IOF raided and searched the headquarters of the local council of Bir Nabala village, northwest of Jerusalem. They confiscated 3 computer sets and several official documents. This raid was the second of its kind this year. On 11 September 2007, IOF issued a military order closing the Ibrahim Mosque for 5 separate days during the holy Ramadan Month, allegedly to allow Jewish settlers to celebrate Jewish occasions.

In the Gaza Strip, IOF conducted 3 incursions into Palestinian communities in the Gaza Strip. On 6 September 2007, IOF moved into al-Qarara village, northeast of Khan Yunis. During this incursion, IOF killed 4 members of the Palestinian resistance and wounded 10 others. They also razed 66 donums of agricultural land. On 7 September 2007, an IOF undercover unit sneaked into al-Salam neighborhood in Rafah and abducted a Palestinian. On 12 September 2007, IOF moved into al-Maghazi refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip. They razed 15 donums of agricultural land.

Restrictions on Movement: On Wednesday morning, 12 September 2007, IOF imposed a total siege on the OPT, which will continue until Sunday, 16 SeptemberIOF have continued to impose a tightened siege on the OPT and imposed severe restrictions on the movement of Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including occupied East Jerusalem.

Gaza Strip

IOF have imposed a strict siege on the Gaza Strip. They have closed its border crossings as a form of collective punishment against Palestinian civilians.

IOF have closed Rafah International Crossing Point, even though they do not directly control it. They have prevented European observers working at the crossing point form reaching it. IOF had already closed Rafah International Crossing Point following an armed attack against an IOF military post in Kerem Shalom area, southeast of Rafah, on 25 June 2006. The crossing point had been partially reopened for short, sporadic periods to allow few numbers of Palestinian to travel through it. The crossing point has been completely closed since Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip and the withdrawal of Palestinian security forces from the crossing point. There are approximately 6,000 Palestinians held at the Egyptian side of the border awaiting to return to their homes in the Gaza Strip. Most of them have run out of money and are living on assistance. In addition, 19 of them have died in Egypt. The bodies were returned to Gaza through the Karm Abu Salem (Kerem Shalom) crossing. In addition, thousands of travelers were allowed to return to the Gaza Strip through al-Ojah crossing, 8 kilometers southeast of Rafah. From there, they were transported to Erez Checkpoint to enter the Gaza Strip. IOF have also closed commercial crossings, especially al-Mentar (Karni) crossing. IOF have continued to close Erez crossing in the northern Gaza Strip. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip have been prevented from traveling through this crossing.

West Bank

IOF have tightened the siege imposed on Palestinian communities in the West Bank. They have isolated Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. IOF positioned at various checkpoints in the West Bank have continued to impose severe restrictions on the movement of Palestinian civilians. IOF also erected more checkpoints on the main roads and intersections in the West Bank. During the reporting period, IOF arrested 2 Palestinian civilians at checkpoints in the West Bank.

[1] 1 donum is equal to 1000 square meters.

Israeli Violations Documented during the Reporting Period (6 – 12 September 2007)


giovedì 13 settembre 2007

Abbas' Village League

Arjan El Fassed, The Electronic Intifada, 10/09/07. For as long Palestinians have resisted violent Israeli policies against them, successive Israeli governments have tried to undermine Palestinian unity and foment divisions. A principal strategy has been to try to foster alternative leaders willing to abandon fundamental Palestinian demands for justice and focus on an agenda with which Israel is comfortable. This is taking place now as Israel shuns the elected Hamas movement, and tries to prop up the discredited Fatah leadership headed by Mahmoud Abbas. Following the elections, Israel kidnapped dozens of elected officials belonging to Hamas and is still holding them in its prisons.

There is a great deal of continuity here; a key component of Israeli policy has been to refuse to recognize legitimate Palestinian leadership. While it now embraces the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and shuns Hamas, until 1993 Israel refused to consider the PLO as a possible negotiating partner. Israel could always produce internationally acceptable reasons for such a position. After all, one would not expect a "respectable" country to negotiate with "terrorists," as Israel always did and still does refer to Palestinian leaders. Even after the PLO's historic concessions in 1988 when the Palestinian National Council, the parliament-in-exile, accepted the two-state solution -- without receiving any reciprocal recognition from Israel -- Israel refused to deal with the PLO directly. The policy goes back even further.

In 1976, in an attempt to forge an alternative leadership to the PLO, Israel allowed elections to be held for municipalities in the occupied West Bank. Contrary to Israel's hopes and expectations, PLO-aligned mayors and councillors swept the board. They called for a complete end to the occupation and opposed talks on Palestinian "autonomy" between Israel and Egypt at Camp David. In 1978 the leaders of this new movement formed the National Guidance Committee, which comprised a wide spectrum of Palestinian national political orientations and included elected mayors (like Bassam Shaka'a and Karim Khalaf who were maimed when Gush Emunim settlers aided by the Israeli military planted bombs in their cars in 1980) and representatives of trade unions, societies and associations.

Just as it has done with Hamas leaders more recently, Israel dismissed the PLO mayors, expelling many of them into exile. In 1980 the mayors of Hebron and Halhoul were deported and the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah were severely maimed by car bombs planted by Israeli death squads. In March 1982, Israel occupation authorities dismissed all elected Palestinian mayors and city councils.

In the early 1990s, Israel was pressured by Washington to negotiate directly with the Palestinians, though it still refused to talk to the PLO. Instead, the negotiations that started in Madrid and continued in Washington, were conducted with respected independent personalities such as Haidar Abdel Shafi -- with the backing of the PLO. It quickly became clear, to Israel's frustration, that these negotiators would stick to basic Palestinian principles and not sell out Palestinian rights. Simultaneously, Israel began a secret back channel with the PLO leadership that had been weakened and bankrupted because its embrace of Saddam Hussein following his invasion of Kuwait. Those talks led to the disastrous Oslo Accords that transformed the PLO into a security subcontractor in the still-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In December 2001, a year into the second intifada, and after the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000 to impose a bantustan solution on the Palestinians, then-Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon decided that PLO leader Yasser Arafat had outlived his usefulness to Israel. Sharon declared Arafat "irrelevant" and cut off relations with the Palestinian Authority. So began a slow decline until Arafat died under mysterious circumstances in November 2004. Arafat was replaced by the current Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who had long enjoyed explicit backing from Washington and who was the key Palestinian figure in the secret channel that led to Oslo.

Abbas is now explicitly armed and backed by Israel and the United States and has declared war on the Hamas movement. We can reach back to another precedent to understand his current role. Following the debacle (from Israel's perspective) of the 1976 municipal elections, it set up the Village Leagues in the 1980s. These were bodies staffed by Palestinian collaborators appointed by Israel.

Unlike the National Guidance Committee and many of the officials elected in 1976, the Village Leagues did not struggle against the occupation. While Israel attempted to suppress an authentic Palestinian national movement and uproot the influence of the PLO, the Village Leagues were an attempt to impose an Israeli form of limited autonomy. The Village League of the Hebron district was established in 1979, headed by former Jordanian Cabinet Minister Mustafa Dudin. In 1981, two more leagues were established in Ramallah and Bethlehem districts. Some members of the Village Leagues had criminal histories.

Because of their willingness to collaborate, Village League leaders were given a facilitator role by Israel; money was channeled through them and they received various benefits from the Israeli rulers. Through a series of military orders, the Leagues were authorized by Israel to arrest and detain political activists and establish armed militias, as well as carry out administrative and bureaucratic tasks such as issuing drivers' licenses. Palestinians living in rural areas had to turn to the Village Leagues for everything from work permits to family reunification permits.

Palestinians responded to the forming of the Village Leagues with demonstrations and strikes, coordinated by the National Guidance Committee. After the deportation of the mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and the maiming of the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah, Ariel Sharon (at that time defense minister) outlawed the National Guidance Committee. The elected mayors and the municipal councils were dismissed.

Israel hoped that the Village Leagues would create and empower a "moderate" Palestinian leadership that would then to agree to negotiate with Israel on the subject of "autonomy" -- a code word for limited self-rule under continued Israeli occupation and colonization. The leagues were designed to provide a "moderate" Palestinian leadership that would be prepared to negotiate with Israel on the subject of autonomy for the West Bank. For that same purpose the Palestinian Authority was established and it is for this reason that Abbas is currently allowed to talk with Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

There is a disturbing parallel with current Israeli policy: just as Israel now uses the Abbas-dominated militias of the Palestinian Authority to crack down on those who resist the occupation, Israel attempted to do the same with the Village Leagues. Members of the Village Leagues had little hesitation when it came to the use of force: they manned roadblocks, carried out checks on identity cards and broke up meetings and demonstrations against the occupation.

It is not known how many members the Leagues had and how much support it received. What is known is that Village League leaders were widely viewed as corrupt, dishonest and having accepted an Israeli definition of the problem. The aims of the Leagues were, in the words of the Hebron district Village League leader Mohammad Nasser: "to improve relations with Israel, to prevent terrorism, to combat communism and to work for the establishment of peace and democracy."

If one replaces the words "communism" with "Islamic extremism" then one has a description that matches almost exactly the stated goals of the Abbas leadership even as it cracks down on civil liberties, gerrymanders election laws, and shuts down over one hundred civil society organizations.

Yet despite Israeli efforts to invigorate the Leagues with massive support, by 1983 they had begun to disintegrate, unable to operate in the face of public resistance. Many Palestinians already consider the players in Abbas' regime as little more than criminals and collaborators. It is only a matter of time before today's Village League, headquartered in Ramallah, headed by Abbas and his unelected prime minister Salam Fayyad, and armed and funded by Israel, the European Union and the United States, is also disbanded by the people.

Arjan El Fassed is cofounder of The Electronic Intifada.